

**SIMILARITY OR COMPLEMENTARITY, WHICH MAKES HAPPIER MARRIAGES:  
ASSORTATIVE MATING AND MARITAL SATISFACTION FOR FIRST MARRIAGES IN  
CHINA, 2006\***

Zheng Mu

Department of Sociology and  
Population Studies Center  
University of Michigan

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Paper prepared for presentation at the 2011 Population Association of America annual meeting in Washington, DC. Direct all correspondence to Zheng Mu, Room 2056, 426 Thompson Street, Population Studies Center, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1248. Email: [zhengmu@umich.edu](mailto:zhengmu@umich.edu).

## **Assortative Mating and Marital Satisfaction for First Marriages in China, 2006**

### **Introduction**

Studies on assortative mating and social homogamy mainly touch on the question of who marries whom in terms of various characteristics, demographic, socioeconomic, attitudes, personality and so forth (Burgess and Wallin 1943; Kalmijn 1991; Mare 1991; Kalmijn 1994; Qian 1998; Raymo and Xie 2000; Blackwell and Lichter 2004; Ono 2005; Schwartz and Mare 2005; Qian and Lichter 2007). There is a longstanding question in this field that do “birds of a feather flock together” (Burgess and Wallin 1943; Kalmijn 1994) or do “opposite attract” (Burgess and Wallin 1943; Schoen et al. 1989). Since people generally make decisions, including their marital choices, in a way that could maximize their wellbeing (Becker 1974), the patterns of assortative mating that people eventually choose may naturally lead us towards the following questions: do those marital decisions make the choosers happier?; what is the actual relationship between assortative mating and levels of marital satisfaction?; specifically, whether positive (similarity) or negative assortative mating (complementarity) improves marital satisfaction?

This link between the direction of assortative mating and marital quality has been one of the main focuses in assortative mating research for long (Luo and Klohnen 2005). Luo and Klohnen (2005) concluded that while some domains of spousal similarity are strongly associated with higher levels of satisfaction, similarity on some other domains are definitely not. What makes it more interesting is that the evolution of modern society is characterized by the increase of social homogamy in terms of achieved rather than ascribed characteristics (Poppel et al. 2001). As a result, which domains of assortative mating have been mainly considered during the process of mate selection and thus been playing the most dominant role in the levels of marital satisfaction is a question tightly related to the overall wellbeing for couples in the modern era.

Moreover, the similarity-satisfaction link has been discussed mostly in domains of assortative mating on values and personality traits, rather than social homogamy in terms of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (Schellenberg 1960; Trost 1967; Luo and Klohnen 2005). Thus, it is of urgent academic importance to investigate how different domains of assortative mating, including those on socioeconomic and demographic traits may associate with the levels of marital satisfaction.

Furthermore, research on assortative mating in terms of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics has mostly served to study the link between assortative mating and the general levels of social openness (Raymo and Xie 2000; Blossfeld 2009) or social inequality. It is widely established that assortative mating has been tightly correlated to the process of stratification as more homogamous

marriages may increase the level of social inequality by strengthening the socioeconomic advantages and disadvantages within respective social classes (Mare 2003; Schwartz and Mare 2005; Schwartz 2010; Torche 2010). This has increasingly been the case with the expansion of higher education when post-secondary education system has progressively been serving as the main marriage markets in modern societies. This may lead to more homogamous marriages for those highly educated in terms of socioeconomic status, demographic characteristics, origins as well as tastes (Kalmijn 1991; Kalmijn and Flap 2001; Blossfeld and Timm 2003; Blossfeld 2009), whereas relatively heterogamous marriages for those with lower education. Therefore, to the extent that the well-received positive link between assortative mating on values/personality and marital satisfaction also holds for assortative mating on socioeconomic and demographic traits, patterns of assortative mating and social homogamy may not only influence the level of social inequality for socioeconomic resources, but also for the overall wellbeing and happiness in terms of the fact that marital satisfaction is a highly crucial aspect of life happiness in general. However, although there are an array of papers discussing about the effects of socioeconomic and demographic backgrounds on marital quality or on general life quality (Ono and Raymo 2006; Lichter and Carmalt 2009; Sassler et al. 2009; Coursolle et al. 2010), few of them directly speak to the effects of spousal similarity in those characteristics on the resulting levels of marital/life satisfactions.

Therefore, this study contributes to the field of assortative mating and social homogamy by directly investigating the relationship between assortative mating in domains of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and the resulting levels of marital satisfaction for couples in China, 2006. Due to the data limitations, we can only analyze the relationship for those respondents in their first marriages and I attempt to partly account for the influence of marital parity by controlling for the marital parity of the respondent's spouse.

## **Research Questions and Hypotheses**

Specifically, the research questions for this study are:

(1) What are the respective directions of the links between assortative mating and marital satisfaction for different domains of assortative mating?

(2) Which domains are more powerful predictors of marital satisfactions for couples in China?

Based on the above research questions, the according research hypotheses are:

Hypothesis 1: Taking other relevant factors constant, higher similarity (positive assortative mating) between husbands and wives in all the three domains of assortative mating (demographic, socioeconomic and origin characteristics) will lead to higher levels of marital satisfaction;

Hypothesis 2: Taking other relevant factors constant, assortative mating in terms of socioeconomic status (achieved traits) should account for more variations within marital satisfaction than that in terms of family origin and demographic characteristics (ascribed traits).

## **Data and Methods**

### Data Source

Data from the 2006 China General Social Survey (CGSS2006) are used for this analysis (Survey Research Center of Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and the Sociology Department of People's University of China, 2006). CGSS is an annually or biannually conducted survey since 2003. It aims to investigate the changing relationship between social structure and quality of life in urban and rural China among Chinese adults age 18 to 69. It is nationally representative with a sampling frame consisting of 2,801 county- or district-level administrative units and including 22 provinces, 4 autonomous regions and 4 central municipalities (Survey Research Center of Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and the Sociology Department of People's University of China, 2006).

### CGSS Sample

The CGSS2006 sample includes 10,151 individuals aged 18 to 69. It utilizes a five-stage stratified sampling design with unequal probabilities. The above-mentioned 2,801 county-or district-level units serve as the primary sampling units stratified into nine strata which are distributed in five major sub-sampling frames. The stratification designs aim to be well representative of China as a whole in terms of its salient regional and rural/urban disparities in the general levels of socioeconomic conditions, including their dramatically different implications on marriage patterns. The survey was conducted with five stages in steps: the first stage includes the selection of the PSUs which are city districts and counties; the second stage includes the selection of townships, town seats and city sub-districts (streets); the third stage includes the selection of neighborhood committees and villagers' committees; the fourth stage includes the selection of households; the fifth stage includes the selection of one eligible household member as the survey respondent within each household (Survey Research Center of Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and the Sociology Department of People's University of China, 2006).

### Analytic Sample

The analysis in this paper includes only a subset of the CGSS2006 observations. Since we are interested in marital satisfaction, the sample will be restricted to those married at the time of the interview.

Due to the fact that we only have complete relevant information on assortative mating domains for respondents who were in their first marriages, the sample is further restricted to those in their first marriages (including both stay married and separated). Moreover, the dependent variable, level of marital satisfaction, was included only in the family questionnaire, which is a random sample taken from the full sample. Thus the sample is further restricted to those participating in both the regular and the family surveys. These restrictions leave us with 2,548 observations in total, 1,115 of which are husbands and 1,433 of which are wives. Weights adjusting for the probabilities of the respondents being selected into the regular sample as well as the additional family survey are used accordingly. Figure 1 shows the process of the finalization of the analytic sample. As recommended by the survey investigators, the analytic sample is weighted using the “family survey individual weight”, the effect of stratification and the effect of clustering will be accounted for respectively by indicating to the software used that there are nine strata as shown by the variable “stratum” and there are 125 clusters as shown by the variable “psu”.

[Figure 1. about here]

### Dependent Variable

Marital satisfaction: The dependent variable is the level of marital satisfaction of husbands and wives. Specifically, this variable is determined based on responses to the question “In general, are you satisfied with your marriage?” Five choices are provided in an ordinal scale: 1=very unsatisfied, 2=unsatisfied, 3=neutral, 4=satisfied and 5=very satisfied.

### Primary Independent Variables

#### *Demographic Assortative Mating*

Age gap between husbands and wives: a five-category variable indicating the difference of age between the husband and the wife. It is treated as a categorical variable so as to capture the nonlinearity nature of the effects of spousal age gap on the resulting levels of marital satisfaction. For example, difference in levels of marital satisfaction between marriages with older wives and age homogamous marriages could be dramatically larger than those between marriages with older husbands and age homogamous marriages; or it could be that marriages with dramatic spousal age gaps may have nonlinearly larger differences in their levels of marital satisfaction compared to those with minor spousal age gaps. Specifically, the age gap variable is codes as: 1 =  $(-\infty, -1.5]$ , 2 =  $(-1.5, 1.5)$ , 3 =  $[1.5, 4.5)$ , 4 =  $[4.5, 6.5)$  and 5 =  $[6.5, +\infty)$ .

### *Socioeconomic Assortative Mating*

Educational gap between husbands and wives: a five-category variable indicating the difference of years of schooling between the husband and the wife. Same as the age gap, it is treated as a categorical variable so as to capture the potential nonlinearity feature of the effects of educational gap on the resulting levels of marital satisfaction. Specifically, the educational gap variable is coded as:  $1 = (-\infty, -2]$ ,  $2 = [-1, 1]$ ,  $3 = [2, 4]$ ,  $4 = [5, 7]$  and  $5 = [8, +\infty)$ .

Economic situation: a five-category variable determined by the question that “When you got married for the first time, compared to your spouse, did you have better or worse economic situation?” It provides five options for answers: 1= much better, 2=somewhat better, 3=similar, 4=somewhat worse and 5=much worse. I will use this variable in two separate models by including it first as an interval variable and then as a categorical variable in order to check its linearity nature. When it is treated as a categorical variable, 3=similar will work as the reference group.

Registration of residence: a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the spouse has different registration status of residence from the respondent when getting married for the first time (0=same, 1=different).

Party membership: a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the spouse has different party membership from the respondent when getting married for the first time (0=same, 1=different).

### *Family Origin Assortative Mating*

Economic situation: a five-category variable determined by the question that “When you got married for the first time, compared to your spouse’s family, did your family have better or worse economic situation?” It provides five options for answers: 1= much better, 2=somewhat better, 3=similar, 4=somewhat worse and 5=much worse. Same as for the individual economic situation, I will use this variable in two separate models by including it first as an interval variable and then as a categorical variable. When it is treated as a categorical variable, 3=similar will work as the reference group.

Registration of residence: a four-category variable reconstructed from the respective registrations of residence for the respondent’s father and the spouse’s father. Specifically, 1= both rural, 2= both urban, 3= respondent’s father rural and spouse’s father urban, and 4=respondent’s father urban and spouse’s father rural. 1=both rural will work as the reference group.

## Control Variables

### *Demographic Characteristics*

Age: a continuous variable indicating the respondent's age.

Ethnicity: a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the respondent belongs to an ethnic minority group. Specifically, 0= Han, and 1= minority.

Religion: a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the respondent believes in any religions. Specifically, 0= atheist, and 1= theist.

### *Socioeconomic Characteristics*

Education: a continuous variable indicating the respondent's years of schooling.

Individual economic situation: a five-category variable indicating respondent's self-assigned socioeconomic status. Specifically, 1= upper or mid-upper, 2= middle, 3= mid-lower, 4= lower, 5= refuse to choose. 4=lower will work as the reference group.

Registration of residence: a dichotomous variable indicating the registration of residence of the respondent. Specially, 0= rural and 1= urban.

Party membership: a dichotomous variable indicating the party membership of the respondent. Specially, 0= not a Communist Party member and 1= Communist Party member.

### *Other Characteristics*

Whether or not is the spouse's first marriage: a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not this is also the respondent's spouse's first marriage. Specifically, 0= yes and 1= no.

Importance of the relationship with spouse: a three-category variable indicating how important the relationship with spouse is compared to that with parents and that with children. Specifically, 1= most important, 2= second important and 3= third important. 3= third important will serve as the reference group.

Ways getting to know the spouse: a dichotomous variable indicating how the respondent got to know his/her spouse. Specifically, 0= blind date arranged by others and 1= know by self.

Locales meeting the spouse: a five-category variable indicating the locales where the respondent met his/her spouse. Specifically, 1= neighborhood, 2= school, 3= work context, 4= family-related context and 5= other. 4=family-related context will serve as the reference group.

Parental influence in mate selection: a three-category variable indicating the importance of parental influence in the process of the respondent's mate selection. Specifically, 1= important, 2= not important, and 3= other. 2= not important will serve as the reference group.

Whether or not others present at the interview: this is a three-category variable indicating whether there are other people present at the interview. Since answers to marital satisfaction is highly subjective and are easily influenced by other individuals, controlling for this variable is a necessary check for the truthfulness of the answers provided. Specifically, 1= none, 2= spouse or children or parents/parents-in-law and 3=other. 1=none will serve as the reference group.

### Statistical Analysis

Analysis will be conducted in steps. First, descriptive statistics (means for continuous/ordinal variables and frequencies for categorical variables) of the primary variables will be computed. Second, bivariate analyses are conducted for the levels of satisfaction and all the indicators of assortative mating through simple ordinal logistic regressions, respectively for men and for women. Thirdly, three sets of models will be estimated for each domain of assortative mating with and without the control variables, respectively for men and for women. Fourthly, three sets of models will be estimated including only two domains of assortative mating variables out of three with and without the control variables, respectively for men and for women. Lastly, one set of full models will be estimated with all the three domains of assortative mating variables included with and without the control variables, respectively for men and for women.

As abovementioned, all the relevant models will be estimated separately for husbands and wives in order to take into account the dramatic gender differences in the attitudes towards marriage and in their actual marital choices (Luo and Klohnen 2005). Ordinal logistic models based on dataset with appropriately specified complex sampling design will be used in order to capture the ordinal nature of the dependent variable without imposing arbitrary distances between the five categories of the level of marital satisfaction. The actual distances between the five categories can be estimated based on the given data by using ordinal logistic models. For additional sensitivity analyses, corresponding multinomial models will be estimated and the results will be compared across those two types of models.

All statistical analyses are adjusted for sampling design effect (stratification and clustering) as well as the unequal probabilities of selection due to non-response, post stratification by rural/urban status, region, socioeconomic status and the re-sampling for the additional family survey. Design effects are calculated for each model so as to estimate the impact of the complex survey sample design on the resulting variance estimates.



## Results

### Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of the primary variables so as to present general patterns of how levels of marital satisfaction change across different domains of assortative mating. As can be seen from Table 1, the average levels of marital satisfaction are higher for men than for women (3.958 vs. 3.887) and there are also quite different patterns for the relationship between varying domains of assortative mating and marital satisfaction. Moreover, the general patterns of the relationship between assortative mating and marital satisfaction are somewhat different from our expectation.

[Table 1. About here]

For men, within the domain of demographic assortative mating, there is no linear decrease in levels of marital satisfaction with spousal age gap (husband's minus wife's) increasing. As shown in Table 1, the average level of marital satisfaction for age-homogeneous couples, that is, those with age gaps between -1.5 to 1.5 years is 3.987, while for those with larger age gaps of 4.5 to 6.5 is 3.992, higher than those for the age homogamous marriages. But for other groups, a negative relationship shows between spousal age gaps and levels of marital satisfaction.

Within the domain of socioeconomic assortative mating, there are even more reversed patterns. While the average levels of marital satisfaction for education-homogeneous couples, that is, those with educational gaps between -1 and 1 year is 3.995, the levels are respectively 3.994 and 4.052 for those with educational gaps between 5 and 7 years and larger/equal to 8 years. For individual economic situation at the first marriage, although the levels of marital satisfaction are higher for couples with similar situations than those for couples with somewhat better situations than spouse, they are lower than all the other categories. Moreover, although couples with the same registration of residence may predict higher marital satisfaction than those without (3.967 vs. 2.896), couples with different Communist Party membership seem to have higher levels of marital satisfaction than those with the same membership (4.029 vs. 3.945).

Within the domain of family origin assortative mating, patterns are also mixed. For the family economic situation at the first marriage, respondents with similar family situations to their spouses are slightly more satisfied than those with somewhat worse situations (3.945 vs. 3.913) and much more satisfied than those with much worse situations than spouse (3.945 vs. 3.477). However, respondents with much better situations and somewhat better situations all have higher levels of satisfactions than those with similar situations (respectively as 4.049 vs. 3.945 and 4.043 vs. 3.945). For the registration of

residence, results further indicate that “similarity” is not the “golden rule” for marital satisfaction. Although those respondents with both their fathers and father-in-law’s having urban registration seem to be more satisfied than those with fathers being rural and spouse’s fathers being urban (4.007 vs. 3.959), they are still less satisfied than those with fathers being urban and spouse’s fathers being rural (4.007 vs. 4.014). Moreover, it seems that respondents with both their fathers and father-in-law’s having rural registration report the lowest level of marital satisfaction (3.936). It seems that the accumulated disadvantages across husbands and wives may actually outplay the benefits brought about by the similarities of the spouses in this regard.

For women, within the domain of demographic assortative mating, there is still no strict linearity showing for the relationship. Although the average level for respondents within age-homogeneous marriages is the highest (3.954), level of marital satisfaction increases within more age-hypergamous groups with higher levels going with larger positive age gaps between husbands and wives.

Within the domain of socioeconomic assortative mating, while the average level of marital satisfaction for education-homogeneous couples is 3.900, the level is 3.940 for those with educational gaps between 2 and 4 years and there is an increase in levels of satisfaction for respondents with educational gaps from 5-7 years to larger/equal to 8 years (3.808 to 3.839). For the individual economic situations at the first marriage, although the level of marital satisfaction is higher for couple with similar situations than those with somewhat better situations than spouse, they are lower than all the other categories. The same status for registration of residence may predict higher marital satisfaction than respondent with different status from their couples (3.895 vs. 3.830), while couples with different Communist Party membership seem to have higher marital satisfaction than those with the same membership (3.965 vs. 3.878).

Within the domain of family origin assortative mating, respondents with similar family economic situations at the first marriage to their spouses are more satisfied than those with worse situations while are less satisfied than those with better situations. For the registration of residence, two categories of “sameness” actually predict lower levels of marital happiness than those with different status for registration of residence.

### Design Effects

As shown in Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4, the complex sampling design utilized for the 2006 CGSS sample dramatically increased variance estimates within a range from 0.824 to 4.431. The extreme cases within them are as follows. In the bivariate analyses for men, the variance estimate for the fifth category of the individual economic situation at the first marriage is 9.9% lower, that for the individual

registration of residence is 17.6% lower and that for the fourth category of the family registration of residence is 1.8% lower than they would have been had a simple random sample of the same size been capitalized on. In the bivariate analyses for women, the variance estimate for the first category of the individual economic situation at the first marriage is 13.2% lower than it would have been had a simple random sample of the same size been utilized. In the multivariate analyses for men, the variance estimate for the individual registration of residence is 26.6% lower than it would have been had a simple random sample of the same size been used. In the multivariate analyses for women, the variance estimate for the first category of the individual economic situation at the first marriage is 8.6% lower than it would have been had a simple random sample of the same size been used. Therefore, the effective sample size ranged from as low as about 575 to as high as about 3,471 (the actual analytic sample size is 2,548) depending on the variable of interest.

#### Bivariate Analyses

As can be seen from Table 2, for the domain of demographic assortative mating indicated by different levels of age gap, and for both men and women, all of the estimated odds ratios of being less satisfied for “dissimilar” marriages to the “similar” marriages are smaller than 1, which, to our surprise, indicates a negative link between similarity of spouses and the levels of marital satisfaction. However, only two of the 95% confidence intervals for men (that for age gaps smaller/equal to -1.5 years and that for age gaps larger/equal to 6.5 years) do not include 1, which means the estimated negative effects of age “similarity” on levels of marital satisfaction are not significantly different from zero at the conventional significant level of 0.05.

[Table 2. about here]

For the domain of socioeconomic assortative mating indicated by different levels of educational gap, for men, the hypothesized positive link between spousal similarity and levels of marital satisfaction only holds for the comparisons of those with very large educational gaps; and for women, the positive link only exists for those with educational gaps between 2 and 4 years. By the individual economic situations, for men, the positive link holds for all the groups except for those with situations somewhat better than their spouses; for women, the positive link holds only for those with somewhat better and much worse situations. By the registration of residence, for both men and women, negative links seem to come out. By the party membership, for both men and women, results show that different membership may lead to lower satisfaction, which runs counter to those shown by the descriptive statistics. However,

for both men and women, none of those odds ratios are significantly different from 1 at the conventional significant level of 0.05.

For the domain of family origin assortative mating indicated by family economic situation at the first marriage, for men, the hypothesized positive link between spousal similarity and levels of marital satisfaction only holds for those with situations much or somewhat better than their spouses with odds ratios larger than 1; for women, the positive link holds for all the groups except for those with situations somewhat worse than their spouses. By the registration of residence, for men, the hypothesized positive links hold for all the comparisons between dissimilar groups to the reference group, the both rural group; for women, those respondents with their fathers and fathers-in-law both having urban registration are more likely to be satisfied than those with their fathers and fathers-in-law both having rural registration. However, for both men and women, none of those odds ratios are significantly different from 1 at the conventional significant level of 0.05. No convincing conclusions can be reached at this point.

### Multivariate Analyses

I estimated models with the same specifications respectively with and without including the control variables. It turns out that the corresponding results are similar. Therefore, due to space limitation, I will only present estimates for the primary variables from models including the control variables without presenting the estimates for the control variables themselves.

As can be seen from the bottom rows in Table 3 and Table 4, based on Archer and Lemeshow's test for goodness of fit, all of the models are strongly rejected at the 0.05 significance level. This means there are many other potential relevant predictors of marital satisfaction needed for better estimation. However, it does show a tendency of better fit by using the full model Model 7 with decreasing F-test statistics for both men and women. Among Model 1, 2 and 3, Model 2, which includes the socioeconomic assortative mating variables seems to work the best. However, among Model 4, 5 and 6, Model 6, which includes the combination of demographic and family origin assortative mating variables seems to provide the best fit to the sample used.

[Table 3 about here]

As can be seen from Table 3 and Table 4, Model 1, 2 and 3 respectively include the three domains of assortative mating variables. Within the demographic domain, for men, only those hypogamous marriages with older wives seem to predict significantly lower marital satisfaction than age homogamous marriages at the 0.05 significance level; while for women, only those with age gaps

between 1.5 and 4.5 years are significantly less satisfied at the 0.10 significance level. Within the socioeconomic domain, for men, only those in marriages with educational gaps between 2 and 4 years seem to have significantly lower marital satisfaction than those in educationally homogamous marriages at the 0.10 significance level; while for women, only those in hypogamous marriages with wives being higher educated are significantly less satisfied at the 0.10 significance level. Within the family origin domain, for men, only those respondents with much worse family economic situations than spouse at the first marriage seem to report worse marital satisfaction at the 0.10 significance level and none of the coefficients is significant for women.

[Table 4 about here]

Model 4, 5 and 6 respectively includes two out of the three domains in order to present the relative importance of domains of assortative mating within pair-wise comparisons. In Model 4, for men, the importance of demographic domain seems to stand out compared to the socioeconomic domain with the only significant predictor being that on those hypogamous marriages with older wives at the 0.05 significance level; for women, however, the two domains in comparison seem to be balanced since all the coefficients on the age gap between 1.5 and 4.5 years, on the educationally hypogamous marriages and on the educational gaps larger than 8 years are significant at the 0.10 significance level. However, the coefficient on educational gaps larger than 8 years is positive (0.690). This indicates significantly higher levels of satisfaction for women with husbands much higher educated. In Model 5, for men, the importance of demographic and family origin domains seems to be balanced. Hypogamous marriages with older wives and marriages with husbands having much worse family economic situations both predict significantly lower levels of satisfaction respectively at the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels. For women, however, demographic domain seems to stand out with coefficient on the age gap between 1.5 and 4.5 years being significant at the 0.10 significance level. In Model 6, for men, the importance of family origin domain seems to stand out compared to the demographic domain with the only significant predictor being that for those respondents with much worse family economic situations than spouse at the first marriage at the 0.05 significance level; for women, however, socioeconomic domain stands out with educationally hypogamous marriages in which wives are higher educated predicting significantly lower levels of marital satisfaction at the 0.10 significance level.

Model 7 is the full model and I include all the three domains in it so as to compare the relative importance of them within a global horizon. For men, coefficients on marriages with older wives, on those with much worse individual economic situations at the first marriage and those with much worse

family economic situations at the first marriage are significantly different from zero respectively at the 0.05, 0.10 and 0.05 significance levels. However, coefficient on those with much worse individual economic situations at the first marriage is positive, which predicts higher marital satisfaction. For women, after including all the three domains, only coefficient on age gap between 1.5 and 4.5 years is negative and significantly different from zero at the 0.10 significance level, which predicts lower marital satisfaction than those age-homogamous marriages.

Aside from the ordinal logistic models, I also estimated their corresponding multinomial logistic models for a sensitivity analysis. It turns out that results and the according conclusions are quite similar by using those two types of models except that those results from the multinomial models are much more unstable and inefficient. This could be due to the fact that much more extra parameters were estimated in the multinomial logistic models while more degrees of freedom are usually desirable in order to achieve more consistent and precise estimates.

## **Discussions**

This study tries to answer the two research questions that 1) whether or not there are positive links between assortative mating and marital satisfaction, that is, whether similar spouses have higher levels of marital satisfaction; and 2) among the three domains of assortative mating, whether or not that based on achieved characteristics (socioeconomic domain) captures more of the variations within levels of marital satisfaction compared to those based on ascribed characteristics (demographic and family origin domains).

As shown by the statistical results, the answers to the first question are highly mixed across different domains of assortative mating, varying variables included in each domain, different types of statistical analyses (descriptive statistics, bivariate analyses and multivariate analyses) as well as across gender. No clear linear positive relationship between levels of assortative mating and levels of marital satisfaction seems to exist within the current sample. Moreover, for the second question, no dominant patterns occur for any specific domains of assortative mating in terms of their relative importance in predicting levels of marital satisfaction. Thus, there is no strong evidence consistent with the second hypothesis that assortative mating based on achieved characteristics should dominate the picture of the positive “similarity-satisfaction” link compared to those based on ascribed characteristics as widely expected by studies in social development and modernization.

However, there are still some evident patterns shown. Specifically, at least within the significant estimates, there seem to be uniform positive links between spousal similarity and marital satisfaction with only two exceptions. For men, respondents with much worse individual economic situations than their

spouses at the first marriage are estimated to have significantly higher levels of marital satisfaction than those with similar situations to their spouse; for women, respondents with spousal age gap larger than 8 years are predicted to have significantly higher levels of satisfaction. Moreover, it seems that men are mainly obtaining higher levels of marital satisfaction through assortative mating based on ascribed characteristics (demographic and family origin domains) indicated by their uniformly significant negative coefficients on age hypogamy and on much worse family economic situations at the first marriage. However, it seems that women are reaching higher levels of marital satisfaction through assortative mating based on both ascribed and achieved characteristics (demographic and socioeconomic domains) indicated by their uniformly significant negative coefficients on age gaps between 1.5 and 4.5 years and on educational hypogamy.

### **Conclusions**

The patterns for the relationship between assortative mating and marital satisfaction in China, 2006 are mixed across different domains of assortative mating, varying measures of assortative mating, different analyses as well as across gender. Within the significant estimates, there seem to be a uniform positive link between spousal similarity and marital satisfaction with only two exceptions. Moreover, while men mainly obtain higher levels of marital satisfaction through assortative mating based on ascribed characteristics (demographic and family origin), women achieves satisfaction through those based on both ascribed and achieved characteristics (demographic and socioeconomic).

### **Future Directions**

Future research is needed to 1) identify other relevant domains of assortative mating to better predict marital satisfaction; 2) identify other relevant control variables in order to get unbiased or consistent estimates so as to accurately capture the direction of the “link”; 3) try to obtain better measurements of variables and use different specifications of the variables for both assortative mating and marital satisfaction in order to get more reliable and efficient estimates so as to test the hypotheses with sharper conclusions; 4) use longitudinal data with event history analysis so as to account for the potential endogeneity for links between assortative mating in certain domains and marital satisfaction, the possible self-selection into marriages for those individuals with specific personality and social characteristics and thus establish more valid causal claims. A good candidate is The China Family Panel Study (CFPS), which started in 2008 and is both longitudinal and national-representative. There is a full set of questions on marital history, as well as detailed information on various demographic, socioeconomic and family origin characteristics in CFPS.

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
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## Figures and Tables

**Figure 1. Process for the Finalization of the Analytic Sample**



Source: China General Social Survey (2006).

Table 1. Domains of Assortative Mating and Levels of Marital Satisfaction (n= 2,548)

| Variables   | Men   |         | Women |       |               |
|---|-------|---------|-------|-------|---------------|
| <u>Dependent Variable (mean, sd, n)</u>               | 3.958 | (0.025) | 1,115 | 3.887 | (0.027) 1,433 |
| <u>Primary Independent Variables</u>                  |       |         |       |       |               |
| <i>Demographic Assortative Mating</i>                 |       |         |       |       |               |
| <b>Husband-Wife Age Gap (mean, sd, n)</b>             |       |         |       |       |               |
| 1= H-W Age Gap $\leq$ -1.5                            | 3.897 | (0.046) | 84    | 3.879 | (0.123) 45    |
| 2= -1.5 < H-W Age Gap < 1.5 (reference)               | 3.987 | (0.036) | 472   | 3.954 | (0.046) 430   |
| 3= 1.5 $\leq$ H-W Age Gap < 4.5                       | 3.973 | (0.041) | 355   | 3.841 | (0.045) 522   |
| 4= 4.5 $\leq$ H-W Age Gap < 6.5                       | 3.992 | (0.072) | 79    | 3.850 | (0.065) 194   |
| 5= H-W Age Gap $\geq$ 6.5                             | 3.833 | (0.090) | 61    | 3.861 | (0.065) 154   |
| <i>Socioeconomic Assortative Mating</i>               |       |         |       |       |               |
| <b>Husband-Wife Educational Gap (mean, sd, n)</b>     |       |         |       |       |               |
| 1= H-W Educational Gap $\leq$ -2                      | 3.863 | (0.073) | 135   | 3.850 | (0.077) 196   |
| 2= -1 $\leq$ H-W Educational Gap $\leq$ 1 (reference) | 3.995 | (0.031) | 495   | 3.900 | (0.036) 691   |
| 3= 2 $\leq$ H-W Educational Gap $\leq$ 4              | 3.901 | (0.056) | 260   | 3.940 | (0.052) 278   |
| 4= 5 $\leq$ H-W Educational Gap $\leq$ 7              | 3.994 | (0.055) | 124   | 3.808 | (0.077) 134   |
| 5= H-W Educational Gap $\geq$ 8                       | 4.052 | (0.076) | 58    | 3.839 | (0.100) 79    |
| <b>Individual Economic Situation (mean, sd, n)</b>    |       |         |       |       |               |
| 1= Much Better than Spouse                            | 4.031 | (0.105) | 59    | 3.926 | (0.167) 16    |
| 2= Somewhat Better than Spouse                        | 3.937 | (0.048) | 310   | 3.893 | (0.110) 178   |
| 3= Similar (reference)                                | 3.950 | (0.031) | 656   | 3.892 | (0.034) 832   |
| 4= Somewhat Worse than Spouse                         | 4.034 | (0.098) | 79    | 3.861 | (0.050) 343   |
| 5= Much Worse than Spouse                             | 4.100 | (0.080) | 11    | 3.931 | (0.128) 64    |
| <b>Registration of Residence (mean, sd, n)</b>        |       |         |       |       |               |
| 0= Same   | 3.967 | (0.028) | 968   | 3.895 | (0.027) 1,269 |
| 1= Different  | 3.896 | (0.047) | 147   | 3.830 | (0.135) 164   |
| <b>Communist Party Membership (mean, sd, n)</b>       |       |         |       |       |               |
| 0= Same   | 3.945 | (0.027) | 925   | 3.878 | (0.029) 1,257 |
| 1= Different  | 4.029 | (0.057) | 190   | 3.965 | (0.061) 176   |
| <i>Family Origin Assortative Mating</i>               |       |         |       |       |               |
| <b>Family Economic Situation (mean, sd, n)</b>        |       |         |       |       |               |
| 1= Much Better than Spouse                            | 4.049 | (0.158) | 19    | 4.146 | (0.251) 16    |
| 2= Somewhat Better than Spouse                        | 4.043 | (0.049) | 213   | 3.929 | (0.049) 241   |
| 3= Similar (reference)                                | 3.945 | (0.031) | 753   | 3.884 | (0.030) 947   |
| 4= Somewhat Worse than Spouse                         | 3.913 | (0.078) | 121   | 3.819 | (0.075) 212   |
| 5= Much Worse than Spouse                             | 3.477 | (0.301) | 9     | 4.067 | (0.273) 17    |
| <b>Registration of Residence (mean, sd, n)</b>        |       |         |       |       |               |
| 1= Both Rural (reference)                             | 3.936 | (0.027) | 575   | 3.884 | (0.037) 696   |
| 2= Both Urban   | 4.007 | (0.051) | 331   | 3.863 | (0.041) 477   |
| 3= Respondent's father rural, spouse's urban          | 3.959 | (0.095) | 66    | 3.899 | (0.094) 125   |
| 4= Respondent's father urban, spouse's rural          | 4.014 | (0.070) | 120   | 3.983 | (0.061) 106   |

Source: China General Social Survey (2006)

Table 2. Bivariate Analyses Results from Models of Marital Satisfaction on Different Domains of Assortative Mating

| Model  | Men (n= 1,115) |                   |       | Women (n= 1,433) |                    |       |
|--|----------------|-------------------|-------|------------------|--------------------|-------|
|  | Odds Ratio     | 95% CI            | DEFF  | Odds Ratio       | 95% CI             | DEFF  |
| <u>Demographic Assortative Mating</u>                  |                |                   |       |                  |                    |       |
| <i>Husband - Wife Age Gap (ref= 2 (-1.5, 1.5))</i>     |                |                   |       |                  |                    |       |
|  |                | n= 1,051          |       |                  | n= 1,345           |       |
| 1= H-W Age Gap ≤ -1.5                                  | 0.576          | [ 0.370 , 0.896 ] | 1.309 | 0.866            | [ 0.391 , 1.917 ]  | 1.283 |
| 3= 1.5 ≤ H-W Age Gap < 4.5                             | 0.863          | [ 0.599 , 1.244 ] | 1.384 | 0.705            | [ 0.474 , 1.049 ]  | 1.982 |
| 4= 4.5 ≤ H-W Age Gap < 6.5                             | 0.868          | [ 0.451 , 1.671 ] | 1.852 | 0.712            | [ 0.454 , 1.116 ]  | 1.270 |
| 5= H-W Age Gap ≥ 6.5                                   | 0.477          | [ 0.240 , 0.948 ] | 1.708 | 0.746            | [ 0.472 , 1.177 ]  | 1.359 |
| <u>Socioeconomic Assortative Mating</u>                |                |                   |       |                  |                    |       |
| <i>Husband-Wife Educational Gap (ref= 2 [-1, 1])</i>   |                |                   |       |                  |                    |       |
|  |                | n= 1,072          |       |                  | n= 1,378           |       |
| 1= H-W Educational Gap ≤ -2                            | 0.679          | [ 0.423 , 1.089 ] | 1.221 | 0.918            | [ 0.548 , 1.537 ]  | 1.405 |
| 3= 2 ≤ H-W Edu Gap ≤ 4                                 | 0.748          | [ 0.495 , 1.130 ] | 1.296 | 1.165            | [ 0.800 , 1.700 ]  | 1.511 |
| 4= 5 ≤ H-W Edu Gap ≤ 7                                 | 1.025          | [ 0.635 , 1.657 ] | 1.927 | 0.736            | [ 0.471 , 1.150 ]  | 2.209 |
| 5= H-W Edu Gap ≥ 8                                     | 1.214          | [ 0.638 , 2.312 ] | 1.336 | 0.893            | [ 0.484 , 1.649 ]  | 1.731 |
| <i>Individual Economic Situation (ref= 3(Similar))</i> |                |                   |       |                  |                    |       |
|  |                | n= 1,115          |       |                  | n= 1,433           |       |
| 1= Much Better than Spouse                             | 1.531          | [ 0.835 , 2.807 ] | 1.020 | 0.998            | [ 0.287 , 3.473 ]  | 0.868 |
| 2= Somewhat Better than Spouse                         | 0.964          | [ 0.632 , 1.470 ] | 2.030 | 1.113            | [ 0.566 , 2.189 ]  | 3.989 |
| 4= Somewhat Worse than Spouse                          | 1.380          | [ 0.612 , 3.109 ] | 2.298 | 0.922            | [ 0.630 , 1.349 ]  | 1.905 |
| 5= Much Worse than Spouse                              | 1.555          | [ 0.820 , 2.949 ] | 0.901 | 1.325            | [ 0.482 , 3.646 ]  | 1.971 |
| <i>Registration of Residence (ref= Same)</i>           |                |                   |       |                  |                    |       |
|  |                | n= 1,115          |       |                  | n= 1,433           |       |
| 1= Different   | 0.802          | [ 0.565 , 1.140 ] | 0.824 | 0.811            | [ 0.352 , 1.867 ]  | 4.431 |
| <i>Communist Party Membership (ref= Same)</i>          |                |                   |       |                  |                    |       |
|  |                | n= 1,115          |       |                  | n= 1,433           |       |
| 1= Different   | 1.352          | [ 0.841 , 2.173 ] | 1.505 | 1.340            | [ 0.866 , 2.073 ]  | 1.418 |
| <u>Family Origin Assortative Mating</u>                |                |                   |       |                  |                    |       |
| <i>Family Economic Situation (ref= 3(Similar))</i>     |                |                   |       |                  |                    |       |
|  |                | n= 1,115          |       |                  | n= 1,433           |       |
| 1= Much Better than Spouse                             | 1.353          | [ 0.344 , 5.317 ] | 1.484 | 2.868            | [ 0.507 , 16.228 ] | 1.770 |
| 2= Somewhat Better than Spouse                         | 1.391          | [ 0.878 , 2.203 ] | 2.127 | 1.116            | [ 0.809 , 1.539 ]  | 1.182 |
| 4= Somewhat Worse than Spouse                          | 0.896          | [ 0.461 , 1.741 ] | 2.081 | 0.877            | [ 0.546 , 1.410 ]  | 1.763 |
| 5= Much Worse than Spouse                              | 0.194          | [ 0.033 , 1.157 ] | 1.974 | 2.123            | [ 0.204 , 22.062 ] | 1.476 |
| <i>Registration of Residence (ref= 1(Both Rural))</i>  |                |                   |       |                  |                    |       |
|  |                | n= 1,092          |       |                  | n= 1,404           |       |
| 2= Both Urban  | 1.515          | [ 0.997 , 2.303 ] | 1.199 | 0.898            | [ 0.632 , 1.274 ]  | 1.388 |
| 3= Respondent's father rural, spouse's urban           | 1.306          | [ 0.737 , 2.314 ] | 1.023 | 1.197            | [ 0.656 , 2.184 ]  | 1.600 |
| 4= Respondent's father urban, spouse's rural           | 1.507          | [ 0.931 , 2.441 ] | 0.982 | 1.254            | [ 0.778 , 2.021 ]  | 1.168 |

Source: China General Social Survey (2006).

Table 3. Selected Results from Models of Marital Satisfaction on Domains of Assortative Mating, Men, With Control (n= 1, 115)

| Model  | Model 1               | Model 2               | Model 3               | Model 4               | Model 5               | Model 6               | Model 7               |          |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------|
| Variable                                     | Coef.                 | Coef.                 | Coef.                 | Coef.                 | Coef.                 | Coef.                 | Coef.                 | DEFF     |
| Intercept 1                                  | -4.701 ***<br>(0.765) | -4.726 ***<br>(0.733) | -4.633 ***<br>(0.757) | -4.950 ***<br>(0.769) | -4.648 ***<br>(0.807) | -4.693 ***<br>(0.787) | -4.883 ***<br>(0.817) | 1.727    |
| Intercept 2                                  | -3.796 ***<br>(0.655) | -3.880 ***<br>(0.632) | -3.727 ***<br>(0.643) | -4.044 ***<br>(0.653) | -3.707 ***<br>(0.685) | -3.816 ***<br>(0.677) | -3.941 ***<br>(0.688) | 1.581    |
| Intercept 3                                  | -1.933 ***<br>(0.550) | -2.056 ***<br>(0.541) | -1.833 ***<br>(0.535) | -2.173 ***<br>(0.563) | -1.807 ***<br>(0.565) | -1.946 ***<br>(0.563) | -2.024 ***<br>(0.577) | 1.303    |
| Intercept 4                                  | 1.889 ***<br>(0.566)  | 1.826 ***<br>(0.555)  | 1.984 ***<br>(0.540)  | 1.692 ***<br>(0.580)  | 2.027 ***<br>(0.576)  | 1.981 ***<br>(0.572)  | 1.876 ***<br>(0.587)  | 1.350    |
| <i>Dem: H-W Age Gap(ref= 2 (-1.5, 1.5))</i>  |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |          |
| 1= H-W Age Gap ≤ -1.5                        | -0.562 **<br>(0.238)  |                       |                       | -0.584 **<br>(0.245)  | -0.528 **<br>(0.228)  |                       | -0.526 **<br>(0.234)  | 1.279    |
| 3= 1.5 ≤ H-W Age Gap < 4.5                   | -0.127<br>(0.201)     |                       |                       | -0.146<br>(0.199)     | -0.098<br>(0.222)     |                       | -0.093<br>(0.217)     | 1.499    |
| 4= 4.5 ≤ H-W Age Gap < 6.5                   | -0.099<br>(0.333)     |                       |                       | -0.152<br>(0.320)     | -0.096<br>(0.347)     |                       | -0.164<br>(0.304)     | 1.365    |
| 5= H-W Age Gap ≥ 6.5                         | -0.625<br>(0.389)     |                       |                       | -0.647<br>(0.402)     | -0.462<br>(0.334)     |                       | -0.453<br>(0.332)     | 1.289    |
| <i>SES: H-W Edu Gap (ref= 2 [-1, 1])</i>     |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |          |
| 1= H-W Educational Gap ≤ -2                  |                       | -0.384<br>(0.260)     |                       | -0.422<br>(0.263)     |                       | -0.331<br>(0.265)     | -0.366<br>(0.272)     | 1.168    |
| 3= 2 ≤ H-W Edu Gap ≤ 4                       |                       | -0.361 *<br>(0.211)   |                       | -0.330<br>(0.209)     |                       | -0.307<br>(0.211)     | -0.292<br>(0.209)     | 1.098    |
| 4= 5 ≤ H-W Edu Gap ≤ 7                       |                       | 0.053<br>(0.282)      |                       | 0.057<br>(0.294)      |                       | 0.114<br>(0.287)      | 0.126<br>(0.299)      | 1.827    |
| 5= H-W Edu Gap ≥ 8                           |                       | 0.181<br>(0.350)      |                       | 0.201<br>(0.344)      |                       | 0.325<br>(0.393)      | 0.336<br>(0.387)      | 1.401    |
| <i>Ind Econ Sit(ref= 3(Similar))</i>         |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |          |
| 1= Much Better than Spouse                   |                       | 0.347<br>(0.334)      |                       | 0.451<br>(0.296)      |                       | 0.255<br>(0.462)      | 0.388<br>(0.412)      | 1.156    |
| 2= Somewhat Better than Spouse               |                       | -0.123<br>(0.223)     |                       | -0.103<br>(0.227)     |                       | -0.285<br>(0.274)     | -0.254<br>(0.278)     | 1.890    |
| 4= Somewhat Worse than Spouse                |                       | 0.231<br>(0.443)      |                       | 0.209<br>(0.417)      |                       | 0.626<br>(0.388)      | 0.604<br>(0.391)      | 1.441    |
| 5= Much Worse than Spouse                    |                       | 0.298<br>(0.381)      |                       | 0.455<br>(0.395)      |                       | 1.016<br>(0.657)      | 1.075<br>(0.617)      | 1.375 *  |
| <i>Regis of Res (ref= Same)</i>              |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |          |
| 1= Different                                 |                       | -0.195<br>(0.202)     |                       | -0.169<br>(0.199)     |                       | -0.129<br>(0.250)     | -0.104<br>(0.241)     | 0.734    |
| <i>Party Membership(ref= Same)</i>           |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |          |
| 1= Different                                 |                       | 0.125<br>(0.494)      |                       | 0.130<br>(0.498)      |                       | 0.119<br>(0.494)      | 0.122<br>(0.499)      | 1.511    |
| <i>Origin: Fam Econ Sit(ref= 3(Similar))</i> |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |          |
| 1= Much Better than Spouse                   |                       |                       | 0.223<br>(0.769)      |                       | 0.173<br>(0.810)      | 0.035<br>(0.987)      | -0.090<br>(0.951)     | 1.920    |
| 2= Somewhat Better than Spouse               |                       |                       | 0.266<br>(0.261)      |                       | 0.278<br>(0.289)      | 0.450<br>(0.332)      | 0.407<br>(0.346)      | 2.301    |
| 4= Somewhat Worse than Spouse                |                       |                       | -0.187<br>(0.361)     |                       | -0.237<br>(0.372)     | -0.421<br>(0.402)     | -0.438<br>(0.416)     | 1.940    |
| 5= Much Worse than Spouse                    |                       |                       | -1.590 *<br>(0.901)   |                       | -1.476 *<br>(0.837)   | -2.357 **<br>(0.949)  | -2.213 **<br>(0.890)  | 1.618 ** |
| <i>Regis of Res(ref= 1(Both Rural))</i>      |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |          |
| 2= Both Urban                                |                       |                       | 0.413<br>(0.268)      |                       | 0.385<br>(0.250)      | 0.435<br>(0.327)      | 0.400<br>(0.321)      | 1.061    |
| 3= Respondent's father rural, spouse's urban |                       |                       | 0.171<br>(0.330)      |                       | 0.157<br>(0.376)      | 0.188<br>(0.354)      | 0.168<br>(0.388)      | 1.125    |
| 4= Respondent's father urban, spouse's rural |                       |                       | 0.315<br>(0.300)      |                       | 0.250<br>(0.314)      | 0.350<br>(0.297)      | 0.351<br>(0.314)      | 1.009    |
| N: sizes of estimation samples               | n= 1, 051             | n= 1, 072             | n= 1, 092             | n= 1, 051             | n= 1, 030             | n= 1, 051             | n= 1, 030             |          |
| Goodness of Fit (F, p-value)                 | 2664.2 0.0            | 2599.5 0.0            | 2637.0 0.0            | 2766.2 0.0            | 2623.6 0.0            | 2564.2 0.0            | 2430.0 0.0            |          |

\*p<0.10, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01. Source: China General Social Survey (2006). Notes: All the models are adjusted for control variables stated in the "Data and Methods" section. However, coefficients on them are omitted from report. Numbers in the parentheses under the coefficients are their respective standard errors. Design effects were only reported for Model 7.

Table 4. Selected Results from Models of Marital Satisfaction on Domains of Assortative Mating, Women, With Control (n= 1, 433)

| Model  | Model 1    |     | Model 2    |     | Model 3    |     | Model 4    |     | Model 5    |     | Model 6    |     | Model 7    |     | DEFF  |
|--|------------|-----|------------|-----|------------|-----|------------|-----|------------|-----|------------|-----|------------|-----|-------|
| Variable                                     | Coef.      |     | Coef.      |     | Coef.      |     | Coef.      |     | Coef.      |     | Coef.      |     | Coef.      |     |       |
| Intercept 1                                  | -6.138     | *** | -5.402     | *** | -5.897     | *** | -5.667     | *** | -6.172     | *** | -5.457     | *** | -5.740     | *** | 1.576 |
|  | (0.645)    |     | (0.676)    |     | (0.624)    |     | (0.688)    |     | (0.664)    |     | (0.693)    |     | (0.713)    |     |       |
| Intercept 2                                  | -3.947     | *** | -3.187     | *** | -3.679     | *** | -3.471     | *** | -3.995     | *** | -3.257     | *** | -3.559     | *** | 1.975 |
|  | (0.579)    |     | (0.631)    |     | (0.552)    |     | (0.639)    |     | (0.599)    |     | (0.647)    |     | (0.713)    |     |       |
| Intercept 3                                  | -2.330     | *** | -1.566     | **  | -2.087     | *** | -1.838     | *** | -2.391     | *** | -1.650     | *** | -1.941     | *** | 1.970 |
|  | (0.547)    |     | (0.611)    |     | (0.512)    |     | (0.625)    |     | (0.568)    |     | (0.625)    |     | (0.648)    |     |       |
| Intercept 4                                  | 1.294      | **  | 2.104      | *** | 1.572      | *** | 1.822      | *** | 1.264      | **  | 2.050      | *** | 1.750      | *** | 1.847 |
|  | (0.522)    |     | (0.599)    |     | (0.497)    |     | (0.610)    |     | (0.540)    |     | (0.611)    |     | (0.629)    |     |       |
| <i>Dem: H-W Age Gap(ref= 2 (-1.5, 1.5))</i>  |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |       |
| 1= H-W Age Gap ≤ -1.5                        | 0.032      |     |            |     |            |     | 0.083      |     | -0.009     |     |            |     | 0.052      |     | 1.336 |
|  | (0.434)    |     |            |     |            |     | (0.439)    |     | (0.438)    |     |            |     | (0.444)    |     |       |
| 3= 1.5 ≤ H-W Age Gap < 4.5                   | -0.358     | *   |            |     |            |     | -0.348     | *   | -0.378     | *   |            |     | -0.359     | *   | 2.014 |
|  | (0.200)    |     |            |     |            |     | (0.203)    |     | (0.201)    |     |            |     | (0.208)    |     |       |
| 4= 4.5 ≤ H-W Age Gap < 6.5                   | -0.256     |     |            |     |            |     | -0.254     |     | -0.255     |     |            |     | -0.252     |     | 1.187 |
|  | (0.220)    |     |            |     |            |     | (0.230)    |     | (0.218)    |     |            |     | (0.230)    |     |       |
| 5= H-W Age Gap ≥ 6.5                         | -0.026     |     |            |     |            |     | 0.026      |     | -0.062     |     |            |     | -0.001     |     | 1.142 |
|  | (0.226)    |     |            |     |            |     | (0.232)    |     | (0.228)    |     |            |     | (0.236)    |     |       |
| <i>SES: H-W Edu Gap (ref= 2 [-1, 1])</i>     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |       |
| 1= H-W Educational Gap ≤ -2                  |            |     | -0.461     | *   |            |     | -0.443     | *   |            |     | -0.440     | *   | -0.421     |     | 1.296 |
|  |            |     | (0.243)    |     |            |     | (0.254)    |     |            |     | (0.248)    |     | (0.258)    |     |       |
| 3= 2 ≤ H-W Edu Gap ≤ 4                       |            |     | 0.182      |     |            |     | 0.215      |     |            |     | 0.170      |     | 0.206      |     | 1.453 |
|  |            |     | (0.206)    |     |            |     | (0.207)    |     |            |     | (0.206)    |     | (0.207)    |     |       |
| 4= 5 ≤ H-W Edu Gap ≤ 7                       |            |     | 0.384      |     |            |     | 0.364      |     |            |     | 0.336      |     | 0.317      |     | 1.931 |
|  |            |     | (0.289)    |     |            |     | (0.290)    |     |            |     | (0.293)    |     | (0.293)    |     |       |
| 5= H-W Edu Gap ≥ 8                           |            |     | 0.626      |     |            |     | 0.690      | *   |            |     | 0.570      |     | 0.628      |     | 1.681 |
|  |            |     | (0.424)    |     |            |     | (0.409)    |     |            |     | (0.431)    |     | (0.417)    |     |       |
| <i>Ind Econ Sit(ref= 3(Similar))</i>         |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |       |
| 1= Much Better than Spouse                   |            |     | -0.092     |     |            |     | -0.126     |     |            |     | -0.338     |     | -0.368     |     | 0.914 |
|  |            |     | (0.589)    |     |            |     | (0.611)    |     |            |     | (0.601)    |     | (0.621)    |     |       |
|  |            |     | 0.117      |     |            |     | 0.065      |     |            |     | 0.168      |     | 0.117      |     | 2.001 |
| 2= Somewhat Better than Spouse               |            |     | (0.319)    |     |            |     | (0.322)    |     |            |     | (0.408)    |     | (0.422)    |     |       |
|  |            |     | -0.218     |     |            |     | -0.230     |     |            |     | -0.265     |     | -0.270     |     | 1.756 |
| 4= Somewhat Worse than Spouse                |            |     | (0.204)    |     |            |     | (0.205)    |     |            |     | (0.258)    |     | (0.262)    |     |       |
| 5= Much Worse than Spouse                    |            |     | 0.231      |     |            |     | 0.206      |     |            |     | 0.166      |     | 0.145      |     | 1.730 |
|  |            |     | (0.513)    |     |            |     | (0.527)    |     |            |     | (0.495)    |     | (0.513)    |     |       |
| <i>Regis of Res (ref= Same)</i>              |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |       |
| 1= Different                                 |            |     | -0.038     |     |            |     | -0.033     |     |            |     | -0.131     |     | -0.111     |     | 2.380 |
|  |            |     | (0.346)    |     |            |     | (0.346)    |     |            |     | (0.355)    |     | (0.361)    |     |       |
| <i>Party Membership(ref= Same)</i>           |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |       |
| 1= Different                                 |            |     | 0.215      |     |            |     | 0.184      |     |            |     | 0.220      |     | 0.187      |     | 1.270 |
|  |            |     | (0.212)    |     |            |     | (0.221)    |     |            |     | (0.221)    |     | (0.232)    |     |       |
| <i>Origin: Fam Econ Sit(ref= 3(Similar))</i> |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |       |
| 1= Much Better than Spouse                   |            |     |            |     | 0.883      |     |            |     | 0.946      |     | 0.965      |     | 0.953      |     | 1.818 |
|  |            |     |            |     | (1.070)    |     |            |     | (1.102)    |     | (1.118)    |     | (1.053)    |     |       |
|  |            |     |            |     | 0.086      |     |            |     | -0.026     |     | -0.081     |     | -0.081     |     | 1.184 |
| 2= Somewhat Better than Spouse               |            |     |            |     | (0.168)    |     |            |     | (0.163)    |     | (0.230)    |     | (0.240)    |     |       |
|  |            |     |            |     | -0.091     |     |            |     | -0.095     |     | 0.014      |     | 0.012      |     | 1.468 |
| 4= Somewhat Worse than Spouse                |            |     |            |     | (0.237)    |     |            |     | (0.247)    |     | (0.275)    |     | (0.295)    |     |       |
| 5= Much Worse than Spouse                    |            |     |            |     | 0.783      |     |            |     | 0.759      |     | 0.786      |     | 0.801      |     | 1.346 |
|  |            |     |            |     | (1.254)    |     |            |     | (1.220)    |     | (1.292)    |     | (1.265)    |     |       |
| <i>Regis of Res(ref= 1(Both Rural))</i>      |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |            |     |       |
| 2= Both Urban                                |            |     |            |     | -0.233     |     |            |     | -0.189     |     | -0.267     |     | -0.245     |     | 1.112 |
|  |            |     |            |     | (0.272)    |     |            |     | (0.291)    |     | (0.256)    |     | (0.275)    |     |       |
| 3= Respondent's father rural, spouse's urban |            |     |            |     | -0.006     |     |            |     | -0.060     |     | -0.054     |     | -0.125     |     | 1.479 |
|  |            |     |            |     | (0.319)    |     |            |     | (0.334)    |     | (0.317)    |     | (0.339)    |     |       |
| 4= Respondent's father urban, spouse's rural |            |     |            |     | 0.015      |     |            |     | -0.043     |     | 0.007      |     | -0.049     |     | 1.212 |
|  |            |     |            |     | (0.297)    |     |            |     | (0.316)    |     | (0.298)    |     | (0.308)    |     |       |
| N: sizes of estimation samples               | n= 1, 345  |     | n= 1, 378  |     | n= 1, 404  |     | n= 1, 345  |     | n= 1, 320  |     | n= 1, 353  |     | n= 1, 320  |     |       |
| Goodness of Fit (F, p-value)                 | 3150.1 0.0 |     | 3034.7 0.0 |     | 3457.4 0.0 |     | 2963.3 0.0 |     | 3218.8 0.0 |     | 3329.1 0.0 |     | 2716.7 0.0 |     |       |

\*p<0.10, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01. Source: China General Social Survey (2006). Notes: All the models are adjusted for control variables stated in the "Data and Methods" section. However, coefficients on them are omitted from report. Numbers in the parentheses under the coefficients are their respective standard errors. Design effects were only reported for Model 7.